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PART III. CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” TOOLKIT:  
THE ISSUE OF PERCEPTIONS
Chapter 10. Silk Road Economic Belt:   
Effects of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Kazakhstan
Bhavna Dave 
(University of London, London)
It was in September 2013 at Nazarbayev University 
in Astana that the Chinese President Xi Jinping 
launched the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, a mas-
sive Chinese-led infrastructural development strate-
gy for establishing connectivity across Central Asia, 
and onward, through the Gulf and Mediterranean 
region, with Europe. Its Central Asia component, 
which he referred to as the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, was a pledge to revive the fabled ancient route 
by means of massive infrastructural investment in 
roads, rail links, bridges, pipelines, and commercial 
networks, as well as expanded socio-cultural ties, in-
cluding people-to-people linkages.
The title “One Belt, One Road” highlights the 
principles of unity and one-ness that underlie China’s 
infrastructural construction strategy. Its goal is to at-
tain shared developmental and security goals through 
cooperation and the complementarity of objectives 
and strategies benefiting all. The choice of Astana, 
and of the Nazarbayev University in particular, as the 
venue for unveiling SREB could not have been more 
symbolic and astute. Hailing the Silk Road initiative 
as a “golden opportunity for development” in the re-
gion, Xi emphasized the special place of Kazakhstan 
by quoting the Chinese proverb that “a close neigh-
bor is more valuable than a distant relative.” 
In China, the launch of BRI has led to the rapid 
rise of institutions, centers, and think tanks for de-
veloping and promoting the various components of 
the strategy. China has held a series of conferences 
and workshops within the country and abroad to 
promote its vision, implement construction projects, 
and garner local support through engagement with 
officials, business experts, and a variety of non-state 
actors. BRI has spurred a flurry of public diplomacy 
to engage the various stakeholders within society and 
reinforce high diplomacy—the handshakes between 
the leaders of China and the Central Asian states that 
serve as affirmations of friendship, a common vision, 
and the convergence of goals and priorities.
Over the past two decades, the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) leadership has established a 
wide-ranging economic and trade partnership with 
the Central Asian states. It has also forged a close 
personal bond with local ruling elites, pledging sup-
port to state sovereignty and non-interference in in-
ternal matters. These promises have boosted the du-
rability of authoritarian regimes in the region and 
weakened social and political challenges.1 However, 
the warm and deferential political rhetoric has not 
overcome public unease, fear, and skepticism. On 
the contrary, the rapidly widening economic part-
nership with China has intensified public fears 
about China’s economic and political ambitions, the 
attraction of the region’s natural resources and raw 
materials, and the influx of Chinese migrants—in 
other words, what locals perceive as China’s creep-
ing economic, commercial, and demographic ex-
pansion. 
Indeed, the gap between Central Asian lead-
ers’ support for China and pervasive public distrust 
persists despite increasingly cordial official ties.2 
China’s policymakers are mindful of the lingering 
negative perceptions about China in its neighbor-
1 Alexander Cooley, “Authoritarianism goes global: Countering democratic norms,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (July 2015): 49–63.
2 Marlène Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change, and the Chinese Factor (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
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hood and beyond, as well as the fear of being “tak-
en over” by China in economic and demographic 
terms. The Chinese expression “warm politics, cold 
public” (zheng re, min leng) reflects an acknowl-
edgement on the part of the Chinese leadership that 
notwithstanding very good elite relations, public 
opinion in neighboring states remains wary of, if 
not completely hostile toward, China.3 Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan share a long border with it, which 
simultaneously offers an opportunity for close part-
nership and serves as a source of angst. China’s of-
ficial rhetoric and public diplomacy have sought to 
curb these widening disparities using the language 
of “complementarity” and mutually beneficial eco-
nomic development. 
As China invests vast amounts in enormous in-
frastructural projects and in agriculture in parts of 
Africa and Asia, the ruling authorities are becoming 
sensitized to local resistance to China’s growing in-
fluence in the economic, business, and sociocultural 
spheres. In response to local protests demanding bet-
ter labor conditions, transparency, and accountabili-
ty, the Chinese have adjusted their policies and made 
appropriate concessions, as the cases of Sri Lanka 
and Thailand show.4 Greater engagement of private 
and state-affiliated Chinese companies with socie-
tal groups, local communities, and trade unions has 
produced a learning curve, resulting in an increas-
ingly cordial and mutually beneficial partnership in a 
number of African states. 
China has embarked on a concerted public di-
plomacy drive, emphasizing people-to-people con-
tacts in order to transform the way it is perceived 
in the region and engaging with a broader array of 
societal actors and stakeholders in order to alter the 
prevailing stereotypes. A vital component of its new 
strategy is the desire to convert its economic and 
commercial power into an important educational 
and cultural resource by offering scholarships and 
numerous opportunities for Central Asians to learn 
the Chinese language and familiarize themselves 
with China’s culture and history. China has already 
allocated vast funds to enhancing educational, cul-
tural, and social cooperation. China’s recent initia-
tives to enhance people-to-people contacts have in-
creasingly relied on projecting its “soft,” or persua-
sive, power through education, propaganda, PR, and 
public diplomacy.
This chapter analyzes China’s projection of soft 
power and numerous public diplomacy efforts to 
promote close people-to-people relations. It assesses 
China’s efforts to mitigate widespread concerns about 
its goals and activities among neighboring popula-
tions by representing itself as a benign peaceful ac-
tor, committed to development and connectivity that 
benefit all. I also look at how China’s public diploma-
cy efforts resonate with various economic and social 
actors in Kazakhstan, to what extent they challenge 
the prevalent stereotypes, and how they contribute to 
building a more favorable image of China. The chap-
ter contributes to debates on China’s soft power and 
public diplomacy in the region within the context of 
important geopolitical shifts and economic partner-
ships.
Economic Power and Infrastructural Investment 
as Cornerstones of China’s “Soft Power”
Joseph Nye defined soft power as a form of non-co-
ercive power which has the effect of “getting others to 
want the outcomes that you want” through the “abil-
ity to attract, [which] leads to acquiescence.”5 Hard 
economic and military power constitute the neces-
sary foundation enabling persuasive power and in-
fluence to emanate from intangible resources such as 
culture and norms. Soft power develops organically 
with the involvement of societal actors; it cannot be 
consciously cultivated, and is not directly mustered 
by state efforts.6 
China’s economic and commercial power, enor-
mous production capacity, and demographic and 
military strength are the foundations of its hard pow-
er. It has all the geopolitical assets for projecting its 
power: vast territory; huge population; a qualified 
labor force; a large middle class and high number of 
professionals; natural resources; production capaci-
ty; military forces; a unified political system; a strong 
cultural tradition; and political stability. The impact 
of China’s hard power has been magnified by the 
3 David Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China’s strategic emergence,” International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010): 127–152.
4 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road (London: Zed Books, 2017).
5 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5–6.
6 Nye, Josef S., “Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy,” in American Power in the 21st Century, ed. David Held and M. Koenig-
Archibugi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 114–133. 
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asymmetry between China and Central Asian states 
in terms of development and demography.7 
BRI is an element of “China’s Dream,” which en-
compasses the country’s strategy from establishing 
supremacy in Asia to attaining global ascendancy.8 It 
is also a personal initiative by Xi Jinping to revitalize 
domestic support for—and thus increase the legiti-
macy of—the leadership of the CPC by carrying out 
further economic reforms that will bring the vision 
of development to life and deliver on the promise of 
material prosperity. At the international level, mean-
while, BRI is a narrative of China’s peaceful model 
of growth and development, particularly for its less 
developed neighbors and isolated regions in Africa.
China has long since replaced Russia as the num-
ber one trading partner of Kazakhstan and the other 
Central Asian states. When Xi unveiled BRI, trade be-
tween Kazakhstan and China amounted to US$28.9 
billion, whereas with Russia it was US$23.5 billion.9 
China is the largest investor in Central Asia; it invest-
ed about US$19 billion in Kazakhstan’s economy in 
the first two decades of the latter’s independence, be-
fore the launch of BRI. It has also made significant 
investments in the energy sectors of Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, as well as Russia. China’s 
economic and commercial success, its ability to carry 
out enormous development projects efficiently at low 
cost, and the affordability of Chinese goods—from 
necessities to “cheap chic” fashion—have helped to 
extend its impact, a form of “soft power,” to every 
household. 
China’s billions of dollars of infrastructural in-
vestments link the border territories of Central Asia 
ever more closely with the developmental plans and 
priorities of adjacent Chinese regions. Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan have been pivotal in the securiti-
zation of Xinjiang and allowing China to extend its 
economic and security axis to the west. The estab-
lishment of cross-border Special Economic Zones 
and logistical cooperation centers is one of the key 
highlights of SREB. The development of Khorgos, 
on the China–Kazakhstan border, as a key transit 
hub and logistical center for cargo on the Silk Road 
between China and Europe is one of the BRI’s flag-
ship projects, comparable with the China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the construction 
of the Humbantota port in Sri Lanka. All three have 
been described as “game changers” with the poten-
tial to deliver huge benefits to the host countries and 
benefit all parties. Khorgos is also being developed as 
the world’s largest dry port, and the one located fur-
thest away from any ocean; this enables Kazakhstan 
to link up to the port of Lianyungang, where China 
is building a China–Kazakhstan international logistic 
cooperation base.10 
The global scale of BRI has inspired widespread 
debates about China’s efforts to restructure the global 
order, financial institutions, and international soci-
ety. It is too early to know whether China is trying 
to reshape the global order through BRI, which is 
both a vision as well as a strategy. While the debates 
on China’s global and geopolitical salience are ongo-
ing and inconclusive, it is clear that in its immediate 
vicinity—in Central Asia and the border regions of 
the Russian Far East—China is emerging as the un-
contested, number one external economic actor and, 
increasingly, as a norm-setter. 
Coordination of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
Nurly Zhol
In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping unveiled the BRI, 
Nazarbayev announced the coordination (sostyko-
vka) of his national development vision, Nurly Zhol 
(“Bright Path”), which is part of the Kazakhstan-2050 
strategy, with the Silk Road Economic Belt strate-
gy. The Kazakhstan-2050 strategy also contains the 
program “100 Concrete Steps,” launched soon after 
Nazarbayev’s re-election in 2015 to undertake “inno-
vative modernization” and realize the country’s am-
bition of joining the top 30 developed countries by 
2050.11 
By emphasizing coordination and complemen-
tarity between Nurly Zhol and SREB, both states 
brought the economic cooperation between them to 
7 Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian perspectives,” 137.
8 Miller, China’s Asian Dream.
9 Olga Sokolai, “Aktual’nyi aktsent Kazakhstanskoi ekonomiki: Nihao, Podnebesnaya!,” Ritm Evrazii 22 (November 2016), http://www.ritmeurasia.
org/news--2016-11-22--aktualnyj-akcent-kazahstanskoj-ekonomiki-nihao-podnebesnaja-26987.
10 “Kazakhstan: Khorgos East Gate Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is an important part of transport and logistic system,” Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, 
January 12, 2016, http://uic.org/com/uic-e-news/480/article/kazakhstan-khorgos-east-gate?page=iframe_enews.
11 “Kazakhstan: Strategy 2050,” https://strategy2050.kz/en/.
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a new level. They signed investment agreements for 
the colossal sum of US$54 billion12 and forged a long-
term partnership and coordination.13 Kazakhstan 
is the only state in the region to have already es-
tablished an “all-round strategic partnership” with 
China.14 It is not only an invaluable supplier of en-
ergy and key mineral resources to China, but also a 
keen supporter of its securitization-oriented devel-
opment of the Xinjiang Autonomous Republic, and 
now a vital transit corridor linking China to Europe. 
As part of its multi-vector foreign policy, Astana has 
emphasized partnership with the West as well as co-
operation with Russia; it has pledged to strengthen 
the Russia-forged Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
of which Kazakhstan is the second most vital partner. 
More recent statements by Kazakhstani officials, 
experts, and media continue to highlight the “cou-
pling” (sopriazhenie) or “aligning” (sostykovka) of the 
country’s own developmental objectives and strategic 
visions with SREB. One analyst defined Kazakhstan 
as the “buckle” (priazhka) in the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, fastening the various links together.15 Many oth-
ers note the changes leading to a positive reception 
of China’s role.16 The “coupling” of the two projects 
rests on the existing framework of bilateral economic 
partnership and trade and commercial ties, as well as 
a multilateral partnership within the SCO framework. 
At the same time, SREB, as part of China’s BRI, 
is seen as coterminous with China’s foreign policy 
rather than its global vision. In many ways, SREB is 
an extension of China’s massive developmental in-
vestments in its “peripheral regions” in the northwest 
(notably the Xinjiang Autonomous Region), geared 
at an aggressive securitization of its restive western 
borderlands through infrastructural development.
The distinction between bilateral agreements, 
partnerships and new projects being launched un-
der SREB is blurred, as many bilateral agreements 
are now being brought under the Silk Road and BRI 
umbrella. While delivering a talk on the effects of 
on Central Asia in August 2016 at the Kazakhstan 
Institute of Strategic Studies under the President in 
Astana, I asked the audience what the appropriate 
Russian abbreviation would be: OBOR or SREB? 
Both sound rather too flippant in Russian to be tak-
en seriously. The chorus of voices advised me, “Just 
say OBOR,” but finally one person said, “Simply say 
China—it’s all the same!,” which prompted laughter 
from the audience. 
SREB, and earlier SCO, together with China’s 
policy toward the region, have had common ele-
ments: emphasis on the principles of non-interfer-
ence, strong support for the regime, and aversion 
to any form of externally induced “regime change.” 
This agnosticism about values and the nature of the 
regime, with a lack of regard for human rights, civil 
society, and normative concerns, has bolstered state 
power and the hold of despotic and authoritarian po-
litical elites in the region. 
The coordination of Nurly Zhol with China’s Silk 
Road development strategy in 2014 provoked mixed 
reactions in Kazakhstan, though media and public 
debates remain circumscribed. Many voiced con-
cerns about the lack of specific details of Chinese in-
vestments and specific projects, despite huge prom-
ises. One well-known expert on China mentioned 
that so far, these investments and projects are like 
apparitions: everyone talks about them, but nobody 
has seen them.17 Others echoed the sentiment that 
details are deliberately kept vague, and the lack of 
a legal framework raises questions about the terms 
and conditions of investments, the transfer of pro-
duction, and the hiring of workers and specialists 
from China. Many also warned that the inevitable 
influx of workers from China would squeeze out 
Kazakhstani workers. The latter concern is, however, 
exaggerated, as the number of Chinese workers and 
traders in Kazakhstan is far smaller than estimated. 
Kazakhstan’s migration laws, devised to protect the 
national labor market, use quotas to impose strict 
limits on the share of foreign workers and the alloca-
tion of top management position to foreigners. 
12 Sokolai, “Aktual’nyi aktsent Kazakhstanskoi ekonomiki.”
13 Sanat Kushkumbayev, “Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol and China’s Economic Belt of the Silk Road: Confluence of Goals,” The Astana Times, September 
22, 2015, http://astanatimes.com/2015/09/kazakhstans-nurly-zhol-and-chinas-economic-belt-of-the-silk-road-confluence-of-goals/.
14 Michael Clarke, “Kazakh Responses to the Rise of China: Between Elite Bandwagoning and Societal Ambivalence?,” in Asian Thought on China’s 
Changing International Relations, ed. Niv Horesh and Emilian Kavalski (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
15 Shaimerden Chikanaev, “GRATA,” February 17, 2017, http://www.gratanet.com/up_files/[GRATA]-FDIs_in_Kazakhstan-Key_Legal_Challenges_
Feb percent202017_rus.pdf.
16 Yaroslav Razumov, “Kazakhstan i Kitai: sblizhenie ili imitatsiia?,” Global Affairs, May 31, 2016, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/
Kazakhstan-i-Kitai--sblizhenie-ili-imitatciya-18190.
17 Adil Kaukenov, China expert. Personal interview with the author, August 2016.
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Andrey Chebotarev, a political analyst, lamented 
Kazakhstan’s failure to formulate its own strategy for 
defending its national interests despite widespread 
panic and fear about China’s expansion. By con-
trast, Valikhan Tuleshov, the director of Institute of 
Regional Development of the International Academy 
of Business, echoed the official line and portrayed 
public concerns as an affirmation of the correct di-
rection of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy, saying, 
“Our political leadership has learnt to balance the po-
litical wind from Russia and the economic one from 
China.”18 Tuleshov blamed the Russian-controlled 
media for projecting Sinophobia and framing Russia 
and China as rivals in Central Asia, noting that such 
fear-mongering about China (“strashilki o KNR”) is 
expediently used by Russia to strengthen its geopo-
litical project of forging the EEU, while at the same 
time Russia seeks to forge multilateral cooperation 
both between the EEU and SRB and between Russia’s 
own developmental projects and those initiated by 
China under BRI.19 
Public opinion surveys funded by the Russia-
based Eurasian Development Bank (an organ of the 
EEU) found that only one in six Kazakh citizens see 
China as a “friendly country,” in contrast to 84 percent 
and 48 percent who see Russia and Belarus, respec-
tively, as “friendly.” Furthermore, these surveys found 
that China was among the top three nations most like-
ly to be named an “unfriendly country.” The in-built 
bias in the survey (it was conducted by a pro-Russia 
bank)20 and lack of any details on methodology prove 
that the data is used for propagandistic purposes. 
Other reports simply note in very general terms that 
Sinophobia—and other negative public perceptions—
could pose a major challenge to the Silk Road project, 
while failing to provide specific details.21
As Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister in 2016, Erlan 
Idrissov rather contentiously invoked the phrase 
“new Great Game in Central Asia,” alluding to prev-
alent Western concerns about Central Asia tilting 
toward China only to rebuke them. Evoking the of-
ficial platitudes, he added, “the strengthening of our 
role as a bridge between Asia and Europe is in our 
raw economic interest and initiatives such as the Silk 
Road Economic Belt will create a wealth of oppor-
tunities in the region and beyond.” He dismissed 
the concerns raised by journalists about asymmetry 
between Kazakhstan and China as “a neat headline” 
that ignores the reality: “a hard-headed and mutually 
beneficial partnership involving Kazakhstan, Russia, 
China, and others which is creating the jobs and in-
vestment Kazakhstan needs.”22
These officials’ assessments indicate Kazakhstan’s 
pragmatic embrace of SREB, its coordination with 
China’s developmental goals, and also the latter’s 
ability to use its persuasive power by deploying its 
economic and manufacturing capabilities alongside 
an invigorated public diplomacy. As cooperation be-
tween both states deepens and benefits start trickling 
in, the asymmetries are likely to widen and trigger 
further concerns about several details that have yet to 
be worked out. Unintended and unanticipated con-
sequences of the partnership will also come to the 
surface. Kazakhstan must simultaneously appease 
national interests, manage popular expectations, and 
be seen as prioritizing its national interests and safe-
guarding its sovereignty and well-being. 
Changing Perceptions and Stereotypes about 
China
As mentioned earlier, Kazakhstanis’ perceptions of 
China are dynamic and complex. Growing familiar-
ity and contacts with the Chinese are bringing about 
shifts in perceptions and attitudes. With the invigo-
ration of China’s public diplomacy, its diplomats and 
other emissaries are also becoming more approach-
able and more engaged with the local milieu. Studies 
of perceptions of China’s role and practices conduct-
ed by Kazakhstani scholars in the late 1990s and 
2000s revealed a widespread pattern of distrust of 
China and anxiety about its ambitions in the region, 
with stereotypes and prejudices running rife.23 Noted 
18 “Eksperty rasskazali ob ekspansii Kitaia v Kazakhstan,” Nur.kz, December 6, 2013, https://www.nur.kz/293563-eksperty-rasskazali-ob-ekspan-
sii-kitaya-v-kazahstan.html.
19 “Eksperty rasskazali ob ekspansii,” Nur.kz.
20 Eurasian Development Bank, http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/index.php?id_16=48994.
21 Dmitriy Frolovskiy, “Kazakhstan’s China Choice,” The Diplomat, July 6, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/kazakhstans-china-choice/. 
22 Erlan Idrissov, “Kazakhstan: 100 Steps Toward a New Nation,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2015, http://www.kazakhembus.com/content/khor-
gos-opens-new-opportunity-eurasia#sthash.24yNkZHJ.dpuf.
23 Elena Sadovskaya, “Chinese migration to Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus 49, no. 1 (2008). See also Laruelle and Peyrouse, The Chinese 
Question in Central Asia.
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Kazakhstani sociologist Konstantin Syroezhkin iden-
tified the pervasiveness of “myths” about China, 
propagated in media, public discourse, and even of-
ficial publications.24 Researchers in Russia have sim-
ilarly reported widespread distrust and stereotypes 
that have no empirical basis.25 The mix of a lack of 
familiarity, ignorance, disinformation, prejudice, and 
anxiety has resulted in exaggeration of the number of 
Chinese in the region, their interests and influence. 
This is compounded by the absence of reliable statis-
tics or methodology for identifying the different cat-
egories of Chinese living in and visiting Kazakhstan. 
Survey research and interviews reveal the scale 
of ignorance and disinformation about the Chinese, 
which are shaped by respondents’ level of familiarity 
with China, their geographical location, social status, 
and level of education.26 Burkhanov and Chen have 
analyzed the differences in Russian and Kazakh me-
dia’s perceptions of the “threats” posed by Chinese 
migration to Kazakhstan, with the latter tending to 
be more nationalistic and xenophobic.27 The prevail-
ing prejudices and distrust, including Sinophobia, are 
rooted in a lack of first-hand contacts between the 
Chinese and Kazakhstanis, and a lack of knowledge 
about one another.
The availability of new information, direct expe-
rience of dealing with the Chinese at various levels, 
and travel to different parts of China are contributing 
to a greater sense of goodwill and trust. However, the 
picture is diverse, mixed, and dynamic, and growing 
familiarity and knowledge do not necessarily and 
consistently lead to greater amity and trust. Attitudes 
are contingent and liable to undergo quick shifts, 
showing that longstanding distrust cannot be easily 
untangled. 
The next sections analyze the protests on pro-
posed amendments to the Land Code to allow 
foreigners to lease agricultural land for up to 25 
years and the debates about the proposal to trans-
fer a number of Chinese production facilities to 
Kazakhstan. These developments indicate shift-
ing attitudes, as well as efforts by both China and 
Kazakhstan to frame China’s role in the region fa-
vorably.
The Debate on Leasing Land
Protests broke out in several towns in Kazakhstan in 
April and May 2016 against proposed amendments 
to the Land Code that would have increased the term 
for which foreigners could lease agricultural land 
from 10 to 25 years. The scale and intensity of pro-
tests against the proposed legislation in various cit-
ies—including Almaty, Astana, Atyrau, Uralsk, and 
Pavlodar—took the state by surprise, and it struggled 
to control this opposition.28 
The proposed law was interpreted as allowing the 
Chinese to take over farmland for agricultural as well 
as commercial purposes. The protests were ignited by 
the fears about the rapid pace of Chinese investment 
under SREB, which was seen as turning Kazakhstan 
into a vast transit corridor, opening up the country’s 
rich resources for exploitation by China, and making 
the country a “dumping ground” for China’s surplus 
production. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian 
states have seen several popular protests sparked by 
reports—verified and unverified—that their govern-
ments had ceded or leased territory to China as part 
of border demarcation or for agricultural cultivation. 
Furthermore, the terms and conditions of leasing 
land have been seen as unfavorable for Kazakhstan; 
they lack environmental safeguards, not to mention 
a clear legal framework on land lease to foreigners, 
property ownership, and the employment of foreign 
workers. These dynamics are seen as aiding informal 
and quasi-legal patterns of land lease and production 
in Kazakhstan from which foreigners benefit at the 
expense of Kazakhs—with Chinese the most import-
ant foreign economic influence. The absence of credi-
ble statistics, facts, and informed debates on the scale 
of Chinese factories, workers, and investments has 
contributed to public anger.
Over the past decade, the Kazakhstani govern-
ment has sought to feel the popular pulse, moderate 
public opinion, and cautiously lay the groundwork 
for popular acceptance of a closer embrace of China. 
The leadership would like the population to adjust to 
a growing Chinese presence in the country and in-
creasing Chinese access to Kazakhstan’s raw materials 
and land resources. Kazakhstan First Deputy Prime 
24 Konstantin Syroezhkin, “Social Perceptions of China and the Chinese: A View from Kazakhstan,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 (2009): 29–46.
25 Vilya Gelbras, “Chinese migration in Russia,” Russia in Global Affairs 2 (April–June 2005), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4962.
26 Sadovskaya, “Chinese migration to Central Asia”; Aziz Burkhanov and Yu-Wen Chen, “Kazakh perspective on China, the Chinese, and Chinese 
migration,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no. 12 (2016): 2129–2148.
27 Burkhanov and Chen, “Kazakh perspective on China.”
28 “Kazakhstan: Crackdown on peaceful protests,” Human Rights Watch, May 23, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/23/kazakhstan-crack-
down-peaceful-protest.
Chapter 10. Silk Road Economic Belt:  Effects of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Kazakhstan
103
Minister Bakythan Sagyntaev rather confidently en-
dorsed the existing scheme for leasing land to foreign 
citizens on May 13, 2014. He stated that the citizens 
of China, Russia, and other states were leasing land in 
Kazakhstan, adding that “there is no problem” with 
this, since Kazakhstan’s Land Code does not prohibit 
leasing land to foreigners or foreign companies: “It is 
another question to sell the land to foreigners—the 
law does not allow it—it only allows lease for up to 
10 years.” He also acknowledged that land in Akmola 
oblast and in East Kazakhstan was leased for agricul-
tural production: “We know who it is leased to, for 
how many years and how many hectares.”29
It was clear that the government had been com-
placent and failed to anticipate the scale of protests. 
The protests may have had the covert or tacit sup-
port of officials and notable figures within the gov-
ernment, given the large scale of public participation 
and popular fury (at least by Kazakhstani standards). 
After initially appearing ineffective and tolerant, the 
authorities cracked down on protestors, making nu-
merous arrests. Nazarbayev announced a morato-
rium on the proposed amendment until the end of 
2017 and pledged to protect national sovereignty and 
interests.30 Prime Minister Karim Masimov, who is 
seen as very close to China (he speaks fluent Chinese 
and has mixed Kazakh–Uyghur origins), issued a 
rare apology for the government’s handling of plans 
to auction off agricultural land to private bidders, 
and announced the formation of a State Commission 
for Land that will include opposition politicians and 
serve as a forum to discuss the contentious issue of 
land privatization.
Having made crucial symbolic concession to 
nationalist concerns, the regime also took harsh 
measures, designed to send the message that unau-
thorized rallies and protests would not be tolerated. 
Social activists Max Bokayev and Talgat Ayan were 
sentenced to three-year prison terms for inciting 
social unrest, spreading false information, and dis-
rupting public order by holding unsanctioned ral-
lies. Another individual, Tohtar Tuleshov, who was 
alleged to have given Ayan US$100,000 to finance the 
protests, was sentenced to 21 years in jail on charges 
of plotting a coup.31 
Transfer of Chinese Production Capacity to 
Kazakhstan 
Another sensitive issue is the proposal to trans-
fer a number of Chinese manufacturing enterpris-
es to Kazakhstan and uncertainty about the legal 
framework within which Chinese managerial staff 
and workers are brought in. At the G20 summit in 
Hangzhou in 2016, China proposed moving the pro-
duction capacity of 51 plants to Kazakhstan under 
the Silk Road development plan, in order to enhance 
its US$20 billion investments. These include work on 
the new railroad transit route Altynkol–Khorgos, the 
Sarybulak–Zimunay gas pipeline, and the Beyneu–
Bozoy pipeline. Details on the plants and their loca-
tions have not been forthcoming, fueling suspicions 
that the transfer of Chinese production capacity to 
the natural resource base for “industrial purposes” 
will generate favorable conditions for them to acquire 
control of land and use it covertly for commercial, 
including agricultural, purposes. This has led to fears 
that the moratorium on leasing land to foreigners 
could easily be circumvented by giving these lands 
to Chinese for industrial construction and staff hous-
ing, which would, de facto, present Chinese with 
the opportunity to use the land for commercial and 
agrarian purposes.32
Opposition activists allege that the transfer of 
Chinese factories to Kazakhstan raise many ques-
tions about the “real interests” of Chinese capital and 
will be followed by the arrival of engineers, techni-
cians, and labor from China, pushing out local staff 
and requiring them to learn Chinese.33 There are 
widespread reports, again lacking sufficient evidence, 
that the local affiliate of China National Petroleum 
Corporation in Aktobe has been asking its workers 
to take Chinese language tests.34 There is also resent-
ment toward KazMunayGas, which sold a crucial 
share to Chinese companies and established a joint 
29 “Kazakhstan dal zemliu v arendu grazhdanam Kitaia,” Nur.kz, May 13, 2014, http://finance.nur.kz/313398.html.
30 “Kazakh president postpones land privatization until 2017,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 5, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-
stan-Nazarbayev-delays-land-privatization/27717597.html.
31 Aigerim Toleukhanova, “Kazakhstan: Land protests trial ends with 5 year jail sentences,” EurasiaNet, November 28, 2016, http://www.eurasianet.
org/node/81441.
32 “Why China transfers production to Kazakhstan?,” Kazworld, September 7, 2016, http://kazworld.info/?p=56343.
33 “Kazakh KazMunayGas to transfer shares to CEFC China,” YiCai Global, July 28, 2017, https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/kazakh-kazmunay-
gas-transfer-shares-cefc-china-energy.
34 Jack Farchy, “Kazakh language schools shift from English to Chinese,” The Financial Times, May 9, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/e99ff7a8-
0bd8-11e6-9456-4 44ab5211a2f/.
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venture in which the Chinese CEFC holds a 51 per-
cent stake in KazMunayGas International (KMGI) 
while the latter retains the remaining 49 percent. The 
venture relies on Kazakhstan’s energy and China’s 
financial resources to expand Belt and Road-related 
business. 
In view of the scant information about govern-
mental negotiations on environment safeguards, 
production-sharing arrangements, and other issues, 
local activists allege a contradiction or double stan-
dard in terms of China’s commitment to environ-
mental protection. China is working to tackle do-
mestic pollution and is also engaged in international 
efforts through multilateral fora such as the Beijing 
Consensus on environmental protection. At the same 
time, however, this lack of details about their envi-
ronmental practices in Central Asia—coupled with 
credible analysis—suggests that China is moving 
high-polluting factories to neighboring states and 
selling crops cultivated through the use of toxic fertil-
izers and pesticides in the region. This has led to sus-
picions that key government figures are the special 
beneficiaries of business deals with China, are with-
holding information, and are thereby contributing to 
“Chinese state control” in Central Asia.35 
The absence of statistics and information make it 
difficult to estimate the number of Chinese migrant 
workers in Kazakhstan; the legal framework under 
which they are brought in; the national composition 
of the top management bodies; work conditions and 
wages paid to the Chinese; and relations between 
Chinese and locals. When I asked a leading Sinologist 
about the legal framework and staff composition of 
Kazakhstan’s numerous Chinese enterprises in 2011, 
he noted that these enterprises seem to function as 
“states within states,” completely closed to outsiders 
and inaccessible to the media.
Kazakhstan’s leading experts do not have a com-
prehensive understanding of the China–Kazakhstan 
economic partnership. Syroezhkin noted, “There is 
no clarity yet about the share of Chinese investments 
and their credit obligations—there are various statis-
tics but it is not clear how to make sense of these. 
China is spending US$2 billion from its US$40 bil-
lion Silk Road infrastructure fund on a new invest-
ment fund to support ‘capacity cooperation’ with 
Kazakhstan, but all the remaining ones are credits.”36 
The conditions of credit are not known and contracts 
are not published, though talks about large-scale in-
vestment and massive projects in which the Chinese 
are participating make the headlines.
The lack of transparency regarding China’s in-
vestments and activities and the process of con-
cluding these deals and tenders also contributes to 
rumors, distortions, and myths, culminating in the 
proliferation of clichés such as “creeping expansion,” 
“covert settlements,” “yellow peril,” and the “use of lo-
cal fronts for Chinese business.”
As with China’s projects under BRI worldwide, 
there are questions about how Central Asian pop-
ulations stand to benefit from the proposed invest-
ments and developmental plans. There is a perceived 
risk that while the various transport “corridors” will 
allow China to export is goods via Central Asia to 
Europe, they may also turn the entire territories of 
Kazakhstan and adjacent states into major transport 
corridors, fulfilling China’s needs.
To a certain extent, the ruling authorities have 
allowed measured public debate. Public figures have 
been able to “air out” their grievances through spon-
taneous societal resistance to expanding Chinese in-
fluence, which is also a way to increase pressure on 
China and so secure better deals. Sinophobia is for 
instance a key instrument used by national-patriots 
who, over a decade and a half ago, were engaged in 
mobilizing public opinion to combat the hegemony 
of Russia and the Russian language.
China’s Public Diplomacy and People-to-People 
Contacts
Since the launch of BRI, China has reinvigorated its 
global public diplomacy. The Chinese political estab-
lishment is taking determined steps to alter notions 
about it held in the West which have become hege-
monic and been shared widely around the world. 
China wants to be seen as a reliable economic partner 
interested in the mutually beneficial pursuit of shared 
objectives but without any political goals. Chinese 
soft power strategy promotes an image of Beijing as 
a reliable and pragmatic economic alternative to the 
West and Russia. In promoting its traditional em-
phasis on infrastructural development and econom-
35 Kazworld, “Why China transfers production to Kazakhstan?”
36 “Private China firm to take control of unit of Kazakh state oil company,” Reuters, December 15, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-ka-
zakhstan-idUKKBN0TY1D320151215.
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ic growth as prerequisites for security and political 
reforms, China is seeking support and legitimization 
for its development strategy by procuring wider pub-
lic support in the region.
China has increasingly been sensitized into pro-
jecting its image as a peaceful, multicultural, tolerant, 
Muslim-friendly country, and is using its activities 
and engagement in the Muslim world—in Central 
Asia, Pakistan, and the Middle East, as well as among 
Muslims in Africa—to enhance its own image, both 
domestically and abroad.
In unveiling the SREB in Astana and emphasiz-
ing deep historical contacts between Kazakhs and 
Chinese, China has also invented connections and 
linkages that did not exist. Xi dated the establish-
ment of close ties between the two peoples to 2,100 
years ago, during the Han dynasty, when Chinese 
envoy Zhang Qian was twice sent to Central Asia 
with a message of peace and friendship. His jour-
neys are portrayed as opening the door to friendly 
contacts between China and Central Asian countries 
along the Silk Road that links East and West, Asia 
and Europe. Xi also referred to Almaty as the “an-
cient city,” but while Kazakh nomads traversed these 
territories and established summer abodes (as evi-
dent from many archaeological relics), Almaty, then 
called Verny by the Russians, was founded in 1854 as 
a Cossack military outpost and was peripheral to the 
numerous Silk Road routes. Xi’s mention of the “Xian 
Xinghai Boulevard”—a name foreign to almost all of 
Almaty’s inhabitants—referred to a street which had 
been so named in 1992 after the signing of a treaty 
with China.37
A central component of the strategy to promote 
“people-to-people” contacts is increasing the num-
ber of opportunities for Central Asians to familiar-
ize themselves with Chinese culture, language, and 
norms, socializing them with China’s world view in 
order to transform negative stereotypes about the 
country.
Emphasizing people-to-people contacts while 
unveiling the Silk Road Economic Belt strategy, Xi an-
nounced that 30,000 government scholarships would 
be awarded to students of SCO member states. He 
also mentioned plans to invite a further 10,000 teach-
ers and students from Confucius Institutes in these 
countries to visit China for study tours. Xi extended an 
invitation to 200 faculty members and students from 
Nazarbayev University to go to China the following 
year for summer camps. In addition, there are Chinese 
Government Scholarships, the Chinese Government 
Chinese Government Special Scholarship Scheme–
University Postgraduate Program in designated uni-
versities, the Distinguished International Students 
Scholarship Scheme, the Chinese Culture Research 
Fellowship Scheme, and short-term scholarships 
for Chinese language studies. There are major cen-
ters for teaching Chinese language to students from 
SCO states at Lanzhou University in Gansu province, 
which is on the list of China’s top 100 universities, 
and at Xinjiang Pedagogical University in Urumqi.38 
China is already the third largest destination for in-
ternational students after the United States and the 
United Kingdom.39 Among international students, 
the perception of China has undergone a noticeable 
shift, with the country becoming an internationally 
recognized destination for high-quality education. 
After Russia, China is the second most popular desti-
nation for students from Kazakhstan. 
Beijing has set up 11 Confucius Institutes to 
promote Chinese language and culture in the five 
Central Asian states. Confucius Institutes, Centers 
and Academies exist in virtually all Central Asian 
states, as well as in Russia, to facilitate knowledge 
and cultural exchanges.40 China’s economic power 
in the region has led a growing number of Central 
Asians to learn Chinese. It is estimated that the num-
ber of students learning Chinese is increasing by 5 
percent per month. Beijing has been actively offering 
scholarships to Kazakhstani students, and accord-
ing to the China Scholarship Council, “the number 
of Kazakh citizens studying in China has risen more 
than fivefold in the past decade, to 12,000.”41 Dariga 
Nazarbayeva, deputy prime minister and daughter of 
37 “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future” (speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Nazarbayev 
University, Astana, September 7, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebel/eng/zxxx/t1078088.htm. A Google search to locate this particular street 
in Almaty showed a string of numerous previous searches asking where the “Xian Xianghai boulevard in Almaty is located.” 
38 Luftiya Abdulkholikzoda, “ShOS: novaia sila v novom mire,” Znaniia, issledovaniia, nauchnyi poisk—prioritet respubliki Tadzhikistan 6, no. 88 
(2015), http://pa-journal.ranepa.ru/articles/r102/3568/.
39 “China’s rapid rise as an international students’ destination,” University Business, September 12, 2016, http://universitybusiness.co.uk/Article/chi-
nas-rapid-rise-as-an-international-student-destination.
40 “Kitai vydelit 30 tysiach stipendii studentam iz stran ShOS dlia obucheniia v VUZakh,” Kabar, August 22, 2015, http://old.kabar.kg/rus/society/
full/61370.
41 Farchy, “Kazakh language schools shift.”
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the country’s president, said in February 2016 that 
Kazakh children should learn Chinese in addition 
to Kazakh, Russian, and English.42 In Kazakhstan—
and much of Central Asia—the attitude is, “If you 
want to go abroad, learn English. If you want to stay 
in Kazakhstan and do well, learn Chinese.” Nurzhan 
Baitemirov, founder of East–West Education Group, 
which specializes in teaching English to Kazakhs, re-
ported increasing interest in learning Chinese among 
young professionals. Himself a graduate of Wuhan, 
Baitemirov said, “West Kazakhstan [the country’s 
main oil-producing region] used to be dominated 
by Canadian companies, but they have shifted and it 
is now majority Chinese companies. It’s better if you 
speak Chinese if you want to get a position.”43
Vera Exnerova describes the broad group of 
non-state actors who are engaged in the process of 
norm socialization and public diplomacy, forming 
and transforming attitudes and knowledge about 
China.44 China is particularly cultivating connections 
with the sections of the local society that have been 
socialized and acculturated into Chinese culture and 
norms, encouraging these individuals to speak with 
policymakers, experts, and the media, as well as to 
share their experiences with ordinary people and dis-
seminate knowledge about the rising and globalizing 
China. In this way, China aims to socialize local citi-
zens into the cherished norms of development, hard 
work, stability, harmony and one-ness. 
Scholars analyzing China’s use of soft power 
in other contexts have noted its increasing engage-
ment of non-state actors and numerous “soft-power 
messengers” who have studied or worked in China, 
or have some other direct association. D’Hooghe 
suggests that, “a majority of these are, in one way or 
another, censured by Beijing.”45 However, these non-
state actors include those promoted by China, as 
well as those acting of their own volition with some 
approval and appreciation of Beijing. By and large, 
they are young and fluent in Chinese, with first-hand 
experience of living in China as students, function-
al socialization into Chinese culture and norms, and 
insight into the Chinese way of thinking and com-
munication (thanks to their study and mastery of the 
language). 
To what extent does Beijing control the message 
being transmitted and in what ways are these “soft 
power messengers” working in sync with Beijing’s 
objectives? The people I talked to who have studied in 
China and/or have regular cultural or educational ex-
changes with institutions in China through contacts 
with the embassy conveyed enthusiasm, excitement, 
and a sense of novelty about having visited China and 
had discussions with officials. However, they cannot 
be seen as socialized primarily into Chinese values. 
They are living in a veritable marketplace of ideas, in-
fluences, and ideologies: the new nationalism, pride 
in nomadic values, and rising prosperity forged un-
der Nazarbayev; the appeal of Western norms, cultur-
al icons, ideas, and intellectual accomplishments; the 
enduring effects of Soviet norms and mindsets; and 
Russia’s resurgent media space and soft power. Other 
influences and ideologies—Western liberal discours-
es as well as non-Western ones (“Asian values,” for 
instance)—also shape their outlook and preferences. 
Aims and Limits of China’s Soft Power
At the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007, 
Hu Jintao alluded to soft power as an important fea-
ture of China’s national policy.46 While obviously re-
sponding to Nye, his formulation sought to combine 
Confucian thought and other traditional Chinese 
philosophy with modern Marxism in order to cre-
ate a notion of Chinese values, or “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.” China’s concept of external 
soft power includes “communicating Chinese posi-
tions and opinions, establishing a good international 
image for China, creating a favorable international 
environment, and promoting a peaceful, harmonious 
and cooperative world.”47 
42 “Nazarbayeva noted the need to learn English and Chinese languages,” The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Official Website, 5 February 2016, https://
primeminister.kz/news/show/22/dNazarbayeva-otmetila-neobhodimost-izuchenija-anglijskogo-i-kitajskogo-jazykov-/05-02-2016?lang=en.
43 “Ucheba v Kitae: chego khotiat i poluchaiut nashi studenty,” Zakon.kz, March 2, 2017, https://www.zakon.kz/4846930-ucheba-v-kitae-chego-khot-
jat-i-chto.html.
44 See Vera Exnerova’s chapter in this volume.
45 Ingrid D’Hooghe, “The limits of China’s soft power in Europe: Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle,” Clingendael Diplomacy Paper 25 (The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2010), 31.
46 Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately 
Prosperous Society in All” (report presented at the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007).
47 Osamu Sayama, “China’s Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, Legitimacy and International Influence,” Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) Occasional Paper (March 2016), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201603_op_chinas_soft_power.pdf.
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While Beijing has rhetorically launched its pub-
lic diplomacy to emphasize its harmonious relation-
ship with the world, its soft power is proposed as an 
alternative to U.S.-led globalization. These “Chinese 
values” are seen as being in competition with the 
“American values” of democracy, human rights, and 
freedom of speech. They seek to strengthen China’s 
voice and influence in the world, and, above all, to 
encourage a sense of pride in the country—a sense 
of nationalism—among Chinese living in China and 
overseas, with the goal of strengthening the regime’s 
control.
The narrative of China’s “peaceful rise” frames 
the country as an emerging Asian power committed 
to development, partnership, peace, and stability. It 
pledges respect to principles of state sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity, and non-interference while seeking 
to promote close people-to-people ties. It is implicitly 
a legitimization of the Chinese model of promoting 
rapid economic development to establish a stable and 
secure environment, while emphasizing stability, se-
curity, and development as more fundamental values 
than the Western liberal norms of freedom and dem-
ocratic choice. The narrative presents China’s “tra-
ditional” culture as pragmatic and peaceful, geared 
towards cooperation and the pursuit of mutual ob-
jectives.
As international relations theorists Paul Viotti 
and Mark Kauppi note, “Non-material capabilities 
such as reputation, culture, and value appeal that 
can aid the attainment of a state’s objectives” are 
crucial in the exercise of soft power.”48 China’s eco-
nomic power, commercial strength, and produc-
tion capacity—providing cheap products of decent 
quality that appear in every household—are the 
foundation of its socioeconomic and cultural influ-
ence. 
Soft power emanates not only from the ideation-
al and normative orientation of the state, but also 
from the engagement of civil society and non-state 
actors—including universities, educational and char-
itable foundations, religious and cultural institutions, 
NGOs, business, and commercial interests—in de-
fining this vision and bringing it to fruition. China’s 
record of censorship and monitoring civil society 
groups, NGOs, and trade unions is a major limita-
tion. Nye notes that the CPC has not accepted that 
“soft power springs largely from individuals, the 
private sector, and civil society.”49 Breslin writes that 
“soft power is conceived as the idea that others will 
align themselves to you and your policy preferences 
because they are attracted to your political and social 
system, values and policies.”50 In this regard, though 
China’s progress and stability are envied by its neigh-
bors, its political and social system and values lack 
broad appeal. Xi Jinping’s primary aim is to further 
consolidate the position of both the CPC and him-
self, rather than to export China’s developmental vi-
sion and state model abroad. 
Civil society and non-state actors in Kazakhstan 
are subject to governmental regulations and restric-
tive laws. However, the numerous pockets of non-
state actors and agencies—those not coopted by the 
state discourse and agenda—are enamored neither 
of China’s developmental discourse nor of Russia’s 
efforts to reclaim geopolitical and cultural space 
through the Eurasian Economic Union; they remain 
circumspect. Their sense of patriotism and national 
pride may coalesce with the state-promoted patrio-
tism, but is also independent of it.
China’s experience of investing in Africa, and, 
more recently, in Sri Lanka and Thailand, reveals 
that public protests, anxieties, and expressions of 
Sinophobia are to be expected in response to rapidly 
expanding Chinese investments and China’s role in 
these countries’ economic development.51 How will 
its experience in Kazakhstan and Central Asian states 
be different? While China has deployed assertive 
and aggressive rhetoric toward its traditional rivals 
in East and Southeast Asia and become embroiled in 
maritime disputes, it has also built a close partner-
ship with Central Asian states and Russia through 
securitization, economic investments, and popular 
diplomacy. China does not have an appealing global 
brand, but it is already transforming norms, prac-
tices, and institutions in its neighborhood and in 
far-off lands by building infrastructure and making 
huge investments.
48 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th edition (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2013), 207.
49 Joseph S. Nye, “The Limits of Chinese Soft Power,” Today’s Zaman, July 10, 2015. 
50 Shaun Breslin, The notion of China’s “soft power” (London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011), 8.
51 “Sri Lanka signs deal on Hambantota port with China,” BBC World Service, July 29, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-40761732; “Sri 
Lanka scales back Hambantota port deal with China after protests,” The Quant, July 26, 2017, “https://www.thequint.com/news/sri-lanka-hamban-
tota-port-deal-with-china.
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China’s active role in and strategic partner-
ship with Kazakhstan, along with its promotion of 
the SCO as an inter-regional organization, also al-
lows China to claim a greater Eurasian identity. This 
embrace of Eurasia is a way of promoting geopolit-
ical expansionism alongside economic globaliza-
tion. Beijing has tightened its control over Xinjiang 
through development and securitization, extending 
the arc of security further west into Central Asia, 
albeit without a military or formal security compo-
nent as yet. Kazakhstani leaders are also interested 
in aiding China’s efforts to promote its status as a 
Eurasian power and Muslim-friendly state commit-
ted to peace, security, and development, in order to 
promote multilateralism in the region and devise a 
balancing strategy. In the context of the Russian–
Chinese tandem, which is likewise described as 
a “close strategic partnership,” Kazakhstan seeks 
to maintain a balanced position by reinforcing its 
multi-vector approach of balancing close ties and 
partnerships with China, Russia, and the West. It 
continues to secure Chinese investments and access 
the bulk of its oil export routes through Russia, as 
well as serving as a solid ally of Russia in forging the 
Eurasian Economic Union. There are, however, con-
cerns among Kazakhstanis about the lack of detail of 
all these projects, the benefits to their country, and 
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions.
China’s symbolic and rhetorical assurance sup-
porting state sovereignty and territorial integrity 
offers important psychological assurance and also 
enhances legitimacy. It strengthens the position of 
Central Asian elites as leaders of sovereign states pro-
tecting their national interests, despite the fact that 
elites’ legitimacy and their commitment to acting 
in the interest of their states has been questioned by 
scholars and policymakers.52 It is not “soft power” per 
se, but the attention and ideological support coming 
from Beijing, together with cash and rituals of def-
erence and hospitality, that appeals to Central Asian 
leaders.53 
The lack of any detailed or in-depth account 
of how local actors—ordinary people, officials, and 
businessmen—as well as transnational actors are en-
gaging with China’s initiatives makes it difficult to 
assess the social and cultural consequences of im-
plementing Chinese infrastructure projects, includ-
ing effects that are unintended and unanticipated. 
Detailed empirical research and ethnographic stud-
ies of specific SREB construction projects or sites are 
needed to gain more specific information on and in-
sights into how China’s soft power, derived from the 
combination of its enormous infrastructure invest-
ments and active public diplomacy efforts, is reshap-
ing local perceptions of and attitudes toward the wid-
ening asymmetry between China and Kazakhstan. 
52 John Heathershaw, “The global performance state: a reconsideration of the Central Asian ‘weak state’,” in Ethnographies of the State in Central 
Asia: Politics Performing, ed. Madeleine Reeves, Johann Rasanayagam and Judith Beyer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013): 39–61.
53 Miller, China’s Asian Dream.
